The signing of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran on the second of Muharram, corresponding to June 17 of this year, gave the region and the world a glimmer of hope that the war between the two sides might finally come to an end, allowing diplomacy to address the causes of the conflict and usher in a period of peace after nearly four decades of cold war between them — with the exception of some three years of relative détente following the 2015 nuclear agreement with the P5+1. Both sides viewed the new memorandum as an opportunity, during the 60 days allocated for negotiations, to secure a final settlement on terms favorable to themselves. The issues to be resolved included ending the state of war in the region, the nuclear program, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, lifting the blockade, and other matters forming part of an eventual settlement. The memorandum was welcomed around the world, particularly by the Arab Gulf states. Although they had themselves been subjected to Iranian attacks, the Gulf states put their active diplomacy to work alongside other mediators to help bring about the understanding, despite attempts to draw them into the war. But mutual trust was absent. The two sides interpreted the memorandum’s provisions differently; Iran and its proxies promoted their own narrative of victory; and President Trump’s narcissism and reliance on personal diplomacy further complicated matters. Under these circumstances, the conditions necessary for successful negotiations and mediation never emerged. The process therefore failed to produce an outcome capable of securing peace and security in the Gulf and the surrounding region, with repercussions extending to global economic security. Iran’s interpretation of Article Five of the memorandum, which dealt with the Strait of Hormuz, directly contributed to the failure to move the negotiations forward. Tehran regarded the memorandum as granting it absolute sovereignty over the Strait, overlooking the rights of sisterly Oman and the other Gulf states bordering its waters, and assuming that it was free to determine what happens there. Iran consequently resumed its attacks on freedom of passage through the Strait, even though it is an international waterway where freedom of navigation is protected under international law. This occurred despite the lifting of the American blockade on Iranian ports and the resumption of Iran’s oil exports.Iran’s renewed use of the Strait of Hormuz as a tool for international pressure and a means of blackmailing its neighbors and the wider world will ultimately work against it. What Tehran regards as leverage could, over time, become a strategic liability. No matter what Iran claims, the international community will not recognize Iranian sovereignty over the Strait. Persisting with such hostile conduct will instead erode Iran’s credibility and the trust placed in it, both among neighboring countries and throughout the international community. Iran also ends up imposing isolation upon itself. Whenever it obstructs passage through the Strait, it brings a blockade upon itself — whether by the United States, as is happening today, or perhaps in the future by international coalitions formed to protect the security of the global economy. At the same time, this behavior encourages regional states to create alternative routes for their imports and exports. As those alternatives develop, the strategic importance of the Strait itself will diminish, meaning Iran cannot expect this source of leverage to remain effective indefinitely. For two decades, Iran has similarly used its nuclear program as an instrument of diplomacy, yet this failed to achieve its objectives — particularly its desire for international recognition as a normal state pursuing its national interests and the interests of its people. Instead, Iran remained internationally isolated. More importantly, the very outcome Iran had sought to prevent — war being waged against it — ultimately came to pass. Its attempt to pressure the international community through its nuclear program therefore did not protect it. Iran should not expect that applying the same diplomacy of blackmail to the Strait of Hormuz will produce a different result. The interests of the region and the wider world would be best served by an Iran that behaves as a normal state, pursuing national interests that advance peace, development and prosperity for its people, while grounding its foreign policy in international law and accepted international norms. Nearly five decades of experience should be enough for Iran’s ideological leadership to recognize that the world will never conform to the vision it has constructed for itself. Iran must conduct itself as a nation-state rather than as an international revolutionary movement. Were it to do so, it would find a world ready to engage with it as an important equal and as a significant and effective contributor to regional and international peace and security. China offers an example. It did not abandon its communist ideology, but it learned to operate as a state that respects the international order and accepts the obligations that come with it. It is therefore in the interests of both the international community and the countries of the region to help Iran make this natural transition, should it choose to do so. Otherwise, it will continue, as it has for decades, to face schemes intended to bring about its destruction — schemes that could eventually succeed, whether they are American, Zionist or Western more broadly. The war launched against Iran, which continues today, is itself an embodiment of plans that had been taking shape over previous decades. Regrettably, Iran’s conduct during the war against it has demonstrated, beyond any reasonable room for interpretation, that it harbored hostile intentions toward its neighbors. It targeted them in its attacks and subsequently sought to justify those actions with baseless claims.Its repeated declarations of goodwill should deceive no discerning observer. Likewise, polished rhetoric about confidence-building measures and establishing good-neighborly relations based on common interests and the principles governing international relations cannot be reconciled with continued attacks against Gulf states and threats directed at them, whether by Iran itself or through its proxies in Iraq and Yemen. The wisdom of the Gulf leaders, their understanding of the interests of their countries and peoples, and their awareness of the importance of regional security and stability prevented them from being drawn into the war. Instead, they relied on the force of reason, effective diplomacy and successful international relations to pursue mediation. Those efforts helped produce the Memorandum of Understanding and continued afterward in an effort to prevent renewed escalation once the memorandum was no longer in effect. Saudi diplomacy, led by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, played an effective role in halting the latest threatened escalation against Iran through continuous engagement with the Trump administration, other mediators and Iran itself. If Iran continues to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in its diplomacy to bring the war to an end, the consequences will not be confined to the United States. Iran itself, the region and the entire world will also suffer. Two decades of diplomacy centered on Iran’s nuclear program did not prevent war. Nor will diplomacy centered on the Strait of Hormuz — and the use of that waterway to blackmail the region and the world — protect Iran from what it fears if it persists in conduct that violates international rules, laws and norms. Iran’s proxies across the region are also rejected by the peoples of the countries in which they operate. Iran would therefore be better served by choosing the path of peace rather than destruction. Today, we are witnessing the emergence of an alliance founded on self-defense and the preservation of stability through the “Makkah Agreement.” The agreement has left the door open to all those who share with its signatory states the pursuit of lasting peace and good-neighborly relations among nations. And now, with the 60-day negotiating period stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding having ended without an agreement, we once again hear both sides exchanging warnings and threats of escalation. The United States has imposed its toughest-ever blockade on Iran in an effort to pressure Tehran into accepting its conditions.And may God’s decree come to pass.The signing of the 14-point Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Iran on the second of Muharram, corresponding to June 17 of this year, gave the region and the world a glimmer of hope that the war between the two sides might finally come to an end, allowing diplomacy to address the causes of the conflict and usher in a period of peace after nearly four decades of cold war between them — with the exception of some three years of relative détente following the 2015 nuclear agreement with the P5+1. Both sides viewed the new memorandum as an opportunity, during the 60 days allocated for negotiations, to secure a final settlement on terms favorable to themselves. The issues to be resolved included ending the state of war in the region, the nuclear program, the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions, lifting the blockade, and other matters forming part of an eventual settlement. The memorandum was welcomed around the world, particularly by the Arab Gulf states. Although they had themselves been subjected to Iranian attacks, the Gulf states put their active diplomacy to work alongside other mediators to help bring about the understanding, despite attempts to draw them into the war. But mutual trust was absent. The two sides interpreted the memorandum’s provisions differently; Iran and its proxies promoted their own narrative of victory; and President Trump’s narcissism and reliance on personal diplomacy further complicated matters. Under these circumstances, the conditions necessary for successful negotiations and mediation never emerged. The process therefore failed to produce an outcome capable of securing peace and security in the Gulf and the surrounding region, with repercussions extending to global economic security. Iran’s interpretation of Article Five of the memorandum, which dealt with the Strait of Hormuz, directly contributed to the failure to move the negotiations forward. Tehran regarded the memorandum as granting it absolute sovereignty over the Strait, overlooking the rights of sisterly Oman and the other Gulf states bordering its waters, and assuming that it was free to determine what happens there. Iran consequently resumed its attacks on freedom of passage through the Strait, even though it is an international waterway where freedom of navigation is protected under international law. This occurred despite the lifting of the American blockade on Iranian ports and the resumption of Iran’s oil exports.Iran’s renewed use of the Strait of Hormuz as a tool for international pressure and a means of blackmailing its neighbors and the wider world will ultimately work against it. What Tehran regards as leverage could, over time, become a strategic liability. No matter what Iran claims, the international community will not recognize Iranian sovereignty over the Strait. Persisting with such hostile conduct will instead erode Iran’s credibility and the trust placed in it, both among neighboring countries and throughout the international community. Iran also ends up imposing isolation upon itself. Whenever it obstructs passage through the Strait, it brings a blockade upon itself — whether by the United States, as is happening today, or perhaps in the future by international coalitions formed to protect the security of the global economy. At the same time, this behavior encourages regional states to create alternative routes for their imports and exports. As those alternatives develop, the strategic importance of the Strait itself will diminish, meaning Iran cannot expect this source of leverage to remain effective indefinitely. For two decades, Iran has similarly used its nuclear program as an instrument of diplomacy, yet this failed to achieve its objectives — particularly its desire for international recognition as a normal state pursuing its national interests and the interests of its people. Instead, Iran remained internationally isolated. More importantly, the very outcome Iran had sought to prevent — war being waged against it — ultimately came to pass. Its attempt to pressure the international community through its nuclear program therefore did not protect it. Iran should not expect that applying the same diplomacy of blackmail to the Strait of Hormuz will produce a different result. The interests of the region and the wider world would be best served by an Iran that behaves as a normal state, pursuing national interests that advance peace, development and prosperity for its people, while grounding its foreign policy in international law and accepted international norms. Nearly five decades of experience should be enough for Iran’s ideological leadership to recognize that the world will never conform to the vision it has constructed for itself. Iran must conduct itself as a nation-state rather than as an international revolutionary movement. Were it to do so, it would find a world ready to engage with it as an important equal and as a significant and effective contributor to regional and international peace and security. China offers an example. It did not abandon its communist ideology, but it learned to operate as a state that respects the international order and accepts the obligations that come with it. It is therefore in the interests of both the international community and the countries of the region to help Iran make this natural transition, should it choose to do so. Otherwise, it will continue, as it has for decades, to face schemes intended to bring about its destruction — schemes that could eventually succeed, whether they are American, Zionist or Western more broadly. The war launched against Iran, which continues today, is itself an embodiment of plans that had been taking shape over previous decades. Regrettably, Iran’s conduct during the war against it has demonstrated, beyond any reasonable room for interpretation, that it harbored hostile intentions toward its neighbors. It targeted them in its attacks and subsequently sought to justify those actions with baseless claims.Its repeated declarations of goodwill should deceive no discerning observer. Likewise, polished rhetoric about confidence-building measures and establishing good-neighborly relations based on common interests and the principles governing international relations cannot be reconciled with continued attacks against Gulf states and threats directed at them, whether by Iran itself or through its proxies in Iraq and Yemen. The wisdom of the Gulf leaders, their understanding of the interests of their countries and peoples, and their awareness of the importance of regional security and stability prevented them from being drawn into the war. Instead, they relied on the force of reason, effective diplomacy and successful international relations to pursue mediation. Those efforts helped produce the Memorandum of Understanding and continued afterward in an effort to prevent renewed escalation once the memorandum was no longer in effect. Saudi diplomacy, led by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, played an effective role in halting the latest threatened escalation against Iran through continuous engagement with the Trump administration, other mediators and Iran itself. If Iran continues to use the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in its diplomacy to bring the war to an end, the consequences will not be confined to the United States. Iran itself, the region and the entire world will also suffer. Two decades of diplomacy centered on Iran’s nuclear program did not prevent war. Nor will diplomacy centered on the Strait of Hormuz — and the use of that waterway to blackmail the region and the world — protect Iran from what it fears if it persists in conduct that violates international rules, laws and norms. Iran’s proxies across the region are also rejected by the peoples of the countries in which they operate. Iran would therefore be better served by choosing the path of peace rather than destruction. Today, we are witnessing the emergence of an alliance founded on self-defense and the preservation of stability through the “Makkah Agreement.” The agreement has left the door open to all those who share with its signatory states the pursuit of lasting peace and good-neighborly relations among nations. And now, with the 60-day negotiating period stipulated in the Memorandum of Understanding having ended without an agreement, we once again hear both sides exchanging warnings and threats of escalation. The United States has imposed its toughest-ever blockade on Iran in an effort to pressure Tehran into accepting its conditions.And may God’s decree come to pass.
Strait Diplomacy: Where Is It Heading
